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Davidson on Believers
Can Non-Linguistic Creatures Have Propositional Attitudes?
Adina Roskies
Donald Davidson has argued that only language-users can have propositional at-
titudes. His strongest argument in support of this claim is one that links having
propositional attitudes to language via a concept of belief. Here I consider various
possible interpretations of this argument, looking first at the canonical conception
of a concept of belief from the Theory of Mind literature, then at a weaker notion
of the concept of belief corresponding to a conception of objective reality, and fi -
nally at an intermediate notion involving the ability to attribute mental states. I
argue that under each of these various interpretations, analysis and appeal to em-
pirical evidence from developmental and comparative psychology shows the Dav-
idsonian argument to be unsound. Only on a reading of the argument that slides
between different interpretations of “concept of belief” are all the premises true,
but in that case the argument is invalid. I conclude that Davidson doesn’t provide
sufficient reason to deny that non-linguistic creatures can have propositional atti-
tudes. 
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1 Introduction
More often than not,  great divides have been
postulated between humans and other animals:
it has variously been maintained that only hu-
mans have souls; that only humans laugh; that
only  humans  play;  that  only  humans  are  ra-
tional. The status of these claims is not merely
of  theoretical  interest:  human  exceptionalism
has long been used to justify or discount arbit-
rary and often inhumane treatment of animals,
including  the  abuses  perpetrated  in  factory
farms and the devastation of  habitats for hu-
man gain. While the issue of the soul is beyond
empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, many
other  claims about  the uniqueness  of  humans
have been shown to be untrue or only half-true.
Recently, in response to philosophical and em-
pirical  work,  there  has  there  been  significant
political pushback. For example, the Great Ape
Project  (http://www.projetogap.org.br/en/)
aims to establish great apes as persons with re-
cognized legal rights. Whether we should stand
behind such a project or other less ambitious ef-
forts  to  treat  animals  as  entities  with  moral
worth depends at least in part on what kind of
capacities they have, both cognitive and affect-
ive.
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Here I combat a philosophically prominent
claim of human uniqueness: Donald Davidson’s
famous argument that only humans can think.
In the light of the complex cognitive activities
of which animals are clearly capable, one might
think this patently untrue. However, Davidson
means by this not that animals have no cognit-
ive capacities at all, but that nonhuman anim-
als cannot have beliefs, desires, and other pro-
positional attitudes. What the thesis does is set
animal cognition apart from human cognition as
a different natural kind, due to radically differ-
ent representation schemes (see also arguments
in Malcolm 1972). This is not a straw man, but
an interesting and challenging thesis. In critic-
ally  evaluating  the  arguments  Davidson
provides in light of empirical evidence from de-
velopmental  psychology  and  ethology,  insight
can be gained into the nature of the relation-
ship between thought and language. Despite its
prima facie plausibility, I conclude that in light
of  contemporary studies  from human and an-
imal  cognition,  arguments  for  restricting  pro-
positional  attitudes  to humans fail.1 The   im-
plications  of  this  result  could  be  far-reach-
ing. Language as a cognitive ability has held a
special status in analytic philosophy, where it is
often  assumed  to  be  foundational  to  thought
and cognition. Rethinking the role of language
as a cognitive newcomer and possibly in large
part a cognitive overlay resting atop a toolbox
of already-powerful cognitive abilities may lead
us to rethink a number of fundamental issues in
philosophy, as well as to reconsider our cognit-
ive and ethical relationship to the rest of the
natural world. This critique of Davidson is illus-
trative of Dennett’s caution: 
[p]hilosophy of  psychology  driven  by the
concerns  of  philosophy  of  language  does
not  fall  happily  into  place.  (Dennett
1987b, p. 204)
The  various  arguments  Davidson  supplies  for
thinking that humans are unique in having pro-
positional attitudes all rest upon the idea that
1 However,  some very interesting and very recent (currently unpub-
lished) work by Susan Carey calls into question the interpretation of
some of the extant pro-propositional attitude empirical work.
having  language  is  an  enabling  condition  for
having  propositional  attitudes.  Since  only  hu-
mans  have  language,  it  follows  that  only  hu-
mans  have  propositional  attitudes.2 Thus,  his
main argument against animal thought is:
P1  If  something  has  propositional  attitudes,
then it has language.
P2 Animals don’t have language. 
C Animals don’t have propositional attitudes.
The logic here is unassailable: if  P1 and
P2 can be established then the conclusion that
animals  lack  propositional  attitudes  follows.
For  Davidson,  having language is having the
ability to speak (1984, p. 167,  2001a, p. 99),
to express one’s thoughts, and to understand
the speech and propositional attitudes of oth-
ers.  It  is  generally  accepted  that  nonhuman
animals don’t  have this  ability,  despite  some
evidence that certain birds and higher mam-
mals  have  some nontrivial  linguistic  abilities
(Kaminski et al. 2004;  Pepperberg 2000;  Sav-
age-Rumbaugh 1986). Therefore, we will grant
P2.3 The  success  of  this  argument  denying
propositional  attitudes  to  nonhumans  there-
fore  rests  on  the  ability  to  establish  P1,
namely the claim that having propositional at-
titudes requires language. In this paper I con-
sider the various avenues by which Davidson
tries to establish  P1, for his arguments make
contact  with  a  broad range  of  research  con-
cerning  mind  and  language,  and  serve  as  a
good guide to attempts to link propositional
attitudes  to  language.  I  begin  by  situating
Davidson’s arguments in his larger theoretical
context, and raise a few methodological wor-
ries  about  his  approach.  I  then  briefly  con-
sider  some  of  his  minor  arguments,  before
turning to his strongest argument linking pro-
positional attitudes to language. I argue that
on  the  most  plausible  consistent  readings  of
2 Davidson equates thought with propositional attitudes. He famously
expresses his denial of propositional attitudes to nonhuman animals
as the claim that animals can’t think. See Davidson (2001a). Here I
focus upon arguments found in his 1975 paper “Thought and Talk”,
and his later paper “Rational Animals”. 
3 Another  reason  for  focusing  on  P1 rather  than  is  that  finding
counterexamples to P2 will at most make room to usher specific spe-
cies into the thought-capable fold, but will not challenge Davidson‘s
argument directly.
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his arguments, one or another premise can be
empirically falsified. I conclude by considering
how  to  proceed  to  better  understand  the
nature and limitations of animal thought.
2 Initial considerations
2.1 Propositional attitudes
A creature is said to have a propositional atti-
tude when she stands in some appropriate rela-
tion  (i.e.,  hoping,  wanting,  fearing,  believing,
etc.) to a proposition.4 What propositional atti-
tudes are, and who may enjoy them, may well
be influenced by what one takes propositions to
be.  For instance,  a skeptic about propositions
may deny that  anyone has  propositional  atti-
tudes in the above sense. For our purposes it is
not  necessary  to  resolve  questions  about  the
nature of propositions, provided that we accept
that  humans can (and do)  have propositional
attitudes—meaning  that  there  is  something
proposition-like to which a thinker can be ap-
propriately related, whether this be a sentence
(Fodor 1978),  a  set  of  possible  worlds  (Lewis
1979; Stalnaker 1984), or a state of affairs (Mar-
cus 1990).  What remains to be determined is
whether  appropriate  relations  to  proposition-
like entities can be supported in non-linguistic
creatures.
2.2 Methodological attitudes
Davidson’s arguments are offered in the con-
text of his larger theoretical commitments to
the  nature  of  mind  and  meaning,  commit-
4 Some have argued that there is no account of what a proposition
is that is both coherent and satisfies the various criteria that pro-
positions  are  traditionally  supposed  to  satisfy  (that  tradition
stemming  initially  from Frege).  See  e.g.,  Dennett (1987a),  and
Churchland (1981). It is unfortunate, but true, that if our notion
of a proposition is fundamentally incoherent, and no compromises
can  be  reached  on  the  criteria  propositions  must  satisfy,  then
there is no such thing as a proposition. A fortiori, we can’t stand
in any meaningful  relation to propositions,  so we lack proposi -
tional attitudes. Such is the position of some eliminativists. Oth-
ers  have  compromised  on  the  demands  put  on  propositions.
Quine,  for  instance,  while  being  no  friend  of  abstract  entities
such as propositions as usually conceived, found sentences to be
less ontologically troublesome stand-ins for them, and held that
to have a propositional attitude is to stand in some relevant rela -
tion  to  an  eternal  sentence—thereby  still  satisfying  our  philo -
sophical intuitions about the role of propositional attitudes in ex-
planations of human thought and behavior. 
ments  that  stem  from  his  interpretationist
philosophy.5 In  general,  interpretationist
strategies answer the following three questions
simultaneously:  “In  virtue  of  what  does  a
creature  have  propositional  attitudes?”,
“which propositional attitudes do they have?”
and “when is one justified in attributing these
attitudes to a creature?” According to inter-
pretationism, a creature has propositional at-
titudes  in  virtue  of  being  interpretable;  the
most  coherent,  charitable  interpretation  that
accurately (or accurately enough) predicts be-
havior is the justified interpretation; and the
contents  of  that  interpretation  serve  to  de-
termine the contents of the creature’s proposi-
tional attitudes. As Byrne puts it, in an inter-
pretationist strategy, “there is no gap between
our  best judgments of  a subject’s  beliefs  and
desires and the  truth about the subject’s be-
liefs and desires,” (1998). Thus, if a creature’s
behavior  can  be  accurately  predicted  or  ex-
plained by an attribution of beliefs and desires
in conjunction with the assumption of ration-
ality,  we are justified  in  attributing proposi-
tional attitudes to the creature. 
Davidson’s  strongest  arguments for why
thought  requires  language  are  motivated  by
his  interpretationism.  On a  strict  interpreta-
tionist view, meaning does not exist  without
interpretation; so if a system is uninterpreted,
it  lacks  contentful  states.  Davidson  believes
that language is a prerequisite for entering the
world of  interpretation.  If  no language,  then
no  interpretation,  so  no  content.  But  let  us
consider, from an interpretationist stance, why
one might think that language is a prerequis-
ite for interpretation.
One might think that Davidson is moved
by the idea that only linguistic behavior can be
interpreted. However, this cannot be Davidson’s
position. If it were, Davidson’s approach to pro-
positional attitude attribution would be at odds
with his own interpretive strategy for attribut-
ing content to mental states. The basic idea of
Davidson’s interpretationism is that in ascribing
content  to another  person’s  mental  states,  we
5 In the literature, “interpretationism” is often used interchangeably with
“interpretivism”. Since “interpretivism” is more commonly used to de-
note a strategy of legal interpretation, I will use “interpretationism” here.
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assume  that  that  person  is  rational,  and  we
ascribe  content  to  her  utterances,  behaviors,
and mental states in such a way as to maximize
the coherence of  that person’s beliefs and de-
sires in light of her behavior. Undeniably, there
is a class of behaviors that humans have and
animals lack, namely linguistic behaviors. How-
ever,  both  humans and animals  share  a  wide
range of non-linguistic behaviors that admit of
interpretation. On the face of it, those behaviors
provide ample evidence upon which to base at-
tributions of mental content, and Davidson him-
self would not refuse to attribute propositional
attitudes to a silent person. However, Davidson
pointedly refuses to apply a straightforward in-
terpretationist strategy to non-linguistic anim-
als. To avoid arbitrariness, an independent ar-
gument  is  needed  to  privilege  language  over
other behaviors. 
Perhaps Davidson believes that rationality
is impossible without language. If we cannot at-
tribute rationality to a creature, the interpreta-
tionist strategy does not apply. More than a few
people  have  argued  that  animals  are  not  ra-
tional,  yet  there  is  reason  to  believe,  under
some  plausible  construals  of  rationality,  that
they are. To hold that rationality presupposes
language commits one to a narrow view of ra-
tionality,  already  colored  by  a  linguistic  bias.
Such  a  view  implicitly  begs  the  question  in
which we are interested. Admittedly, what ra-
tionality is  is  a  vexed question in  philosophy,
and determining whether a creature is rational
falls prey to the same holistic problems as de-
termining  whether  it  has  propositional  atti-
tudes. A theory of rationality predicated upon a
conception of practical reason instead of upon
linguistic  manipulation  appears  to  be  more
neutral. There is abundant evidence for practic-
ally rational behavior in the animal world. After
all, animals of all stripes are here now because
they have been evolutionary successful, and to
have succeeded requires in some nontrivial sense
that goals are achieved by instrumental beha-
vior.6 All animals exhibit some degree of ration-
6 Decision theory, for instance, gives us one model of rationality. Inter-
estingly, in many ecological studies of foraging behavior that use de-
cision theory to assess animal choice, animal behavior is found not to
just be adaptive, but optimal. For example, animal foraging decisions
approach optimality. See e.g., Stephens & Krebs (1986).
ality,  construed in  this  way.  Building  on  this
view  of  rationality  promises  to  enable  us  to
posit  criteria  or  hallmarks  for  minimally  ra-
tional  behavior  that  are  independent  of  lan-
guage, yet also to concede that some rational
behaviors are linguistically dependent, and thus
unique to humans. Indeed, one might think that
a good way to assess rationality would be to see
to what extent an animal’s behavior is predict-
able or explicable with reference to survival re-
quirements and common sense belief–desire psy-
chology. A wide range of animal behaviors cer-
tainly seem apt for explanation with reference
to the rational interplay of ecologically-relevant
propositional attitudes. If one thinks that apt-
ness for explanation in terms of  rationality is
sufficient evidence for rationality, and accepts,
as Davidson does, that rationality rests on the
interplay  of  propositional  attitudes,  then  we
have ample evidence that animals have proposi-
tional attitudes, rather than that they do not. 
Davidson, however,  obviously thinks that
the reasons to deny animals propositional atti-
tudes supersede reasons to attribute rationality
to them; he applies modus tollens to my modus
ponens. Since he denies that animals have pro-
positional  attitudes,  and he  thinks  rationality
requires propositional attitudes, he denies that
animals are rational. We are led to very differ-
ent  conclusions  about  the  nature  of  animals’
mental lives depending upon whether we take
ourselves to be more justified in attributing ra-
tional behavior to them or in refusing to attrib-
ute to them propositional attitudes. Because the
questions of propositional attitudes and of ra-
tionality are both equally troubling and closely
linked, arguments against animal thought based
on assumptions about rationality are not com-
pelling.
Thus, we have as yet failed to find ample
reason to refuse to apply the basic interpreta-
tionist  strategy to non-linguistic  animal  beha-
vior. Perhaps Davidson thinks that, in the ab-
sence of language, we have insufficient evidence
for attributing propositional attitudes to anim-
als. Perhaps it is because Davidson thinks that
“having the gift of tongues” is both necessary
and sufficient for having propositional attitudes
(1984, p. 156, 2001a, p. 104), he views language
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possession as the evidential criterion for proposi-
tional  attitude  attribution.  He  consequently
denies  that  we can be justified  in  attributing
propositional attitudes to creatures on the basis
of  non-linguistic  behavior.  Language gives  the
radical interpreter the green light:  evidence of
linguistic  behavior  licenses  application  of  the
radical interpretive strategy. 
Even if we grant that language is the best
evidence for propositional attitudes, we should
be immediately  suspicious  of  the  presumption
that  the  only  evidence  relevant  for  deciding
whether  something has  propositional  attitudes
is the presence of a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for having them. In normal empirical in-
quiry, criteria that are necessary and sufficient
are rarely the only ones that qualify as evidence
for  assessing empirical  claims.  For instance,  a
rash may be relevant evidence for determining
whether a person has Lyme disease, despite the
fact that not all people with rashes have Lyme
disease,  and  not  all  people  with  Lyme  have
rashes. Might there not be evidence highly in-
dicative of whether a creature has propositional
attitudes, despite the fact that the evidence is
not decisive? Reasonable,  predictable  behavior
is surely a clear source of evidence for the exist-
ence of propositional attitudes, despite the fact
that  it  only  provides  defeasible  reasons  for
thinking they exist. 
Furthermore,  unlike  instrumentalists  like
Dennett, Davidson seems to favor the idea that
beliefs are real; his anomolous monism posits a
physical-causal substrate for mental states,  al-
beit  one  that  exempts  psychology  from being
reduced  to  physical  laws.7 One  might  think,
nonetheless, that it would be reasonable for a
realist to accept the possibility that beliefs in-
volve some internal representational structures,
and that there could therefore be other types of
reliable evidence besides linguistic evidence for
the  presence  of  propositional  attitudes.  Thus,
Davidson’s  exclusive  focus  on  language  is  in
tension with his realist leanings. Furthermore, if
7 The debate about propositional attitudes, language, and capacity for
thought has implications beyond philosophy of mind to ethics. As
Davidson himself noted, personal and sub personal levels of descrip-
tion refer to different logical subjects, and thus  Davidson’s argument
has implications for the possibility of attributing  personhood to an-
imals. See again, http://www.projetogap.org.br/en/.
one is a realist about thought, it is not the evid-
ential question, but rather the question of the
grounds of  possibility for having propositional
attitudes  that  should  be  of  primary  interest.
The Davidsonian mix of interpretationism and
realism creates an uneasy tension, for while he
tends  toward  realism  about  belief,  he  often
seems to think the metaphysical and epistemo-
logical construals of the question amount to the
same thing:  a  creature has propositional  atti-
tudes if  we ought to interpret  him as having
them. I suspect that this collapsing of the issues
accounts for Davidson’s view that the question
of  whether  a  creature  has  propositional  atti-
tudes is closely tied to the evidential question of
what evidence is relevant for deciding whether
something has propositional attitudes.
There is, as fard as I can tell, a lack of a
substantive  argument  for  requiring  that  a
creature has language to be a candidate for in-
terpretation, as well as for holding that only the
presence of language provides sufficient evidence
for  attributing  propositional  attitudes.  Thus,
neither the interpretationist strategy itself, nor
Davidson’s  concerns  about  evidential  warrant
justify the position that only language-speaking
creatures can be candidates for propositional at-
titudes.  Now let  us turn to the specific argu-
ments Davidson offers for denying animals pro-
positional  attitudes:  the  reasons  he  offers  for
holding that language is necessary for thought. 
3 Minor arguments
Why might someone think that language is ne-
cessary  for  having  propositional  attitudes?  A
common reason for supposing that language is
necessary for thought is that one is in the grip
of  a  picture  about  the  nature  of  thought—
namely that thought is a type of language, or is
linguistic  or  language-like.  If  propositions  are
linguistic entities, then creatures that lack the
capacity for linguistic representation might well
be unable to represent propositions and thus be
unable  to hold an attitude toward a proposi-
tion.  However,  since  there  are  competing  ac-
counts of what propositions actually are, several
of which see them as non-linguistic in nature,
the intuitive language-like characteristics of pro-
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positions  does  not  settle  the  question  (Lewis
1979; Stalnaker 1984). 
In several places  Davidson gestures at re-
lated  arguments  for  denying  non-linguistic
creatures propositional attitudes (1984, p. 156,
2001a, p. 98). These stem from an implicit com-
mitment to propositional attitudes having cer-
tain characteristics that only languages possess.
For  instance,  Davidson  claims  that  proposi-
tional attitudes have definite content, and that
only things expressed in language have definite
content. Drawing on the discussion of  Malcolm
(1972) before him, he gives an example of a dog
chasing a cat up a tree. Like Malcolm, he notes
that we cannot attribute to the dog the thought
that the cat ran up the maple, as opposed to
that the cat ran up the tree. If there is no par-
ticular  thought  we  can  attribute  to  the  dog,
then the dog hasn’t had a thought with definite
content, and so hasn’t had a propositional atti-
tude. Davidson elsewhere claims that proposi-
tional attitudes are opaque8, and that language
accounts for their opacity (Davidson 2001a, p.
97).  Although these  claims can be  combatted
directly, I will not pursue those arguments here.
Both the definite content claim and the opacity
claim lose their teeth when it is recognized that
they take the following form: 
P1 Propositional attitudes have a property, p
P2 Language has property p
C Therefore, language is necessary for proposi-
tional attitudes 
This argument is fallacious—it would only
be valid if nothing but language had property p.
But no such argument is on offer. It is worth
noting, moreover, that whether propositional at-
titudes have the property p in question is itself
contentious—do  all  our  beliefs  have  definite
content? Finally, even if having property p were
somehow constitutive of thought, and to have p
thought had to be linguistic, this would still not
entail that a creature with beliefs and desires
must have language in Davidson’s sense. Fodor
8 Substitution of co-reffering terms in “opaque” contexts may not pre-
serve  truth.  Such  is  the  case  with  propositional  attitudes.  Thus,
while it is true that Lois Lane believes “Superman is a hero”, it may
be false that she believes “Clark Kent is a hero”, despite the fact
that Clark Kent is identical to Superman.
(see Fodor 1975),  for  instance,  thinks  that  a
creature  must  have  a  language  of  thought  to
have propositional attitudes, but he holds that
it need not be able to speak or understand a
public language to have a language of thought.
Even if claims about definite content and opa-
city were true, that is, if Fodor is right, David-
son has erred in thinking that thought requires
an external as opposed to an internal language.
If animals have a language of thought, they are
non-language-using believers.
4 Davidson’s Master Argument
The above minor arguments don’t play a central
role in Davidson’s support of  P1. The strongest
support for the crucial premise is found in what I
will call his Master Argument.9 The Master Argu-
ment puts psychological restrictions on what it is
to be an interpreter, and it supports the claim that
one  cannot have propositional  attitudes  without
language. If the Master Argument succeeds, then
Davidson’s  arguments  for  denying  that  animals
have propositional attitudes is compelling. But, as
I  shall  argue,  the  Master  Argument  ultimately
fails, and thus also fails to support the denial of
propositional attitudes to animals.
According to Davidson’s interpretationism,
having beliefs entails being an interpreter. The
basic idea of the Master Argument is that pos-
sessing certain concepts is a prerequisite for be-
ing an interpreter, and that an organism must
have language in order to have these concepts.10
9 Davidson  nowhere  presents  his  Master  Argument  in  this  precise
form. I reconstruct the logical form of his argument from “Thought
and Talk” and “Rational Animals”.
10 This ought to be distinguished from the idea that having proposi-
tional thought requires having some concepts, and that the contents
that can be entertained by a creature in propositional thought are
constrained by the set of concepts that the creature possesses. This
view, held by a variety of thinkers from Frege to Fodor, stems from
the belief that the propositions to which a thinker stands in relation
in having a propositional attitude are complex entities composed of
concepts. But then the question of whether animals have proposi-
tional thought can be recast as the question of whether animals have
concepts.  If,  additionally, one combined this view of the cognitive
structure  of  propositions  with a view according  to which concept
possession requires language, one would have an argument for why
language is necessary for propositional thought. However, whether
concept  possession  requires  language  is  a  question  that  depends,
among other things, on what concepts are. Whether the vehicles of
thought are language-like, as I argued earlier, is orthogonal to the is-
sue of whether an organism possesses the capacity to speak or under-
stand  speech.  Therefore  Davidson’s  argument  cannot  rest  on  the
nature of concepts.
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Davidson’s  position  differs  from  the  more
widely-held view that having  some concepts is
required  for  having  propositional  thought,  by
supposing that there are specific concepts that a
creature must possess in order to have proposi-
tional  thought.  The  Master  Argument  links
thought  to  language  by  way  of  higher-order
thoughts. Specifically, Davidson suggests that a
concept  of  belief is  a prerequisite  for proposi-
tional attitudes, and that a concept of belief is
unavailable  without  language.  Here  is  David-
son’s Master Argument:
M1 If S has propositional attitudes, then S has
beliefs.
M2 If S has beliefs, then S has a concept of be-
lief. 
M3 If S has a concept of belief, then S has lan-
guage.
MC If S has propositional attitudes, then S has
language.
The  argument  is  clearly  valid.  But  is  it
sound? 
M1 is plausible; it just highlights Davidson’s
view that beliefs are a fundamental propositional
attitude, and that to have any propositional atti-
tudes at all, a creature must have some beliefs.
M2 and M3, the remaining premises, are interest-
ing, but their meaning is unclear, for they contain
a clause that needs to be unpacked: what exactly
is a “concept of belief”? Let us distinguish three
different  conceptions  of  a  “concept  of  belief”,
varying  in  stringency.  One  conception  of  the
concept of belief is robust, in which the concept of
belief is the fully articulated belief-concept that is
taken to be definitive of a mature theory of mind.
On this robust view, having a concept of belief is
an epistemologically-rich notion that entails hav-
ing an ability to pass the “false belief test”. That
is, it is criterial for having the concept of belief
that one has the ability to attribute to others a
mental representation of the world that may differ
from the way the world is, as well as a recognition
of the perceptual circumstances that would en-
gender false representations. In contrast, a defla-
tionary  conception  of  what  it  is  to  have  the
concept of belief merely requires an understand-
ing that the world is distinct from how it appears
or how one takes it to be, or that belief can come
apart from reality. On a deflationary view, then,
having the concept of belief is rather like having
the concept  of  an objective reality.  Finally,  we
might  consider  an  intermediate  notion  of  the
concept of belief that involves the ability to at-
tribute representational mental states to oneself
and others, without satisfying all the constraints
that a robust conception must meet. Which, if
any, of these conceptions of “concept of belief” is
important for Davidson’s argument linking belief
to language? 
4.1 The robust conception of belief
The robust conception of belief became import-
ant in developmental psychology in the context
of concerns about Theory of Mind: having a no-
tion of false belief was taken to be diagnostic of
a  mature  TOM,  and,  according  to  many  re-
searchers in the field, only develops in humans
at around four years of age (Saxe et al. 2004;
Wellman et al. 2001;  Wimmer & Perner 1983).
However, requiring a concept of belief in the ro-
bust sense seems too demanding a condition for
having propositional attitudes. While we might
plausibly  doubt  whether  prelinguistic  infants
really have propositional attitudes, it is hard to
deny that young children who have already ac-
quired  a  sophisticated  facility  with  language
have  propositional  attitudes.  Children  of  two
and three, for instance, clearly refer to objects
in the world using language, and they readily
express  their  desires  (“I  want  the  green
monkey!”),  beliefs  (“I  think the  ball  is  under
the bed”), as well as fears and other proposi-
tional attitudes. They understand others, refer
to  their  own  and  others’  mental  states,  and
communicate effectively. We typically and with
great  conviction  attribute  propositional  atti-
tudes to children of these ages. Nonetheless, ac-
cording  to  most  developmental  psychologists
(See  e.g., Perner et  al. 1987; Call et  al. 1999;
http://youtu.be/8hLubgpY2_w),  until  the age
of four (two years after they develop consider-
able language abilities) children lack a concept
of  belief  in  the  robust  sense.11 And if  so,  we
11 Kristen Andrews takes autistic subjects to be counterexamples to David-
son’s view, which would also argue against M2. (Andrews 2002).
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make  ordinary  propositional  attributions  to
children  well  before  they  possess  the  robust
concept of belief. Thus, M2 is false.12 
Not all psychologists agree that a robust
concept  of  belief  doesn’t  develop  until  about
four years of age. Some have argued that the
methods used in many of the classic false belief
studies rely too much on language or on inhibit-
ory control, and that tests other than the classic
false belief test are sufficient for demonstrating
understanding  of  false  beliefs.  For  instance,  a
recent  study  suggests  that  children  have  a
concept of belief at far earlier ages than previ-
ously thought—earlier, in fact, than the devel-
opment of language (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005;
Baillargeon et al. 2010;  Caron 2009). However,
if this is so, then M3 is false, for the robust con-
ception of belief does not depend on having lan-
guage. This version of the Master Argument de-
pends upon a tight connection between compet-
ence in the false-belief task and belief. On one
conception of what evidence is sufficient to re-
flect performance on the false-belief task, M2 is
false,  and on another conception,  M3 is false.
Either way, the Master Argument is empirically
refuted,  and  the  robust  conception  of  “the
concept of belief” fails to link language posses-
sion and propositional attitudes.13 
Davidson  may  well  be  unperturbed,  for
there is no textual evidence that he means to im-
plicate the robust conception of belief when he
claims the concept of belief is necessary for having
beliefs. After all, from the standpoint of his rad-
ical interpreter, one can only be a believer in vir-
tue of interpreting others, but it is unclear why
the possibility of such interpretation should rest
upon a grasp of others’ mental states being beliefs
in this robust sense, rather then in some weaker
sense.  In  “The Second  Person”  (1992),  for  in-
stance,  Davidson argues  that  for  our  mental
12 In addition, at ages far younger than those at which children pass
the false-belief task, they act as interpreters, in Davidson’s sense.
Any parent knows that their  children interpret speech well before
they are speakers, and long before the age at which they pass the
false-belief  task.  So  if  interpretation is  central  to  having  proposi-
tional attitudes, it doesn’t require a robust theory of mind.
13 Of course, Onishi and Baillergeon’s interpretation is subject to refut-
ation. Should their findings (they developed a nonverbal task that
suggest that infants much younger than previously supposed repres-
ent others’ mental states, such as goals, perceptions and beliefs.) re-
flect something like proto-beliefs rather than full-blown propositional
attitude-sustaining beliefs, M3 would not be falsified.
states to have determinate content we must inter-
act with another being in order to “triangulate”
and thus make determinate the referents of our
thoughts. Nothing in this picture requires that an
interpreter have a robust concept of belief as op-
posed to a more deflationary one. 
4.2 The deflationary conception of belief
In line with the idea that Davidson has a more
deflationary  view  in  mind,  in  both  “Thought
and Talk” and “Rational Animals” he mentions
a different criterion for having a belief, which he
also thinks links the possession of language to
the ability to have propositional attitudes. This
is the criterion of possessing a concept of “ob-
jective truth.” Davidson’s argument for language
via the criterion of objective truth is as follows:
O1 In order to have propositional attitudes, one
must have beliefs.
O2 In order to have beliefs, one must have a
concept of objective truth.
O3  In  order  to  have  a  concept  of  objective
truth, one must have language.
OC Propositional attitudes require language.
The logic here is again unproblematic, but
unpacking the premises is not. At times David-
son  seems  to  equate  the  concept  of  objective
truth with that of belief. I take this as evidence
that he intends “the concept of belief” in the
Master Argument in its most deflationary inter-
pretation:  as  an  understanding  that  how  the
world is can come apart from how one takes the
world to be. Given this interpretation one could
believe that the concept of objective truth co-
occurs with that of belief, or that the cognitive
conditions that make possible the concept of be-
lief  are the same as those that make possible
the  concept  of  objective  truth.  In  any  case,
Davidson sees  a tight  connection between the
notions of belief and objectivity. 
How are we to understand the “concept of
objective  truth”  in  O2 and  O3?  If  Davidson
means it to be a metasemantic concept, such as
having a Tarskian definition of truth, or an un-
derstanding that truth applies to propositions,
and so on, then it would be almost assured that
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one  could  not  grasp  the  concept  of  truth
without language. It would explain the  prima
facie plausibility of the Objective Truth version
of the Master Argument. However, if we adopt
that  reading of  objective  truth,  O2 would be
false, for people certainly have propositional at-
titudes even if they never become philosophers,
and even if  they never have an inkling about
metasemantic notions.
Another clue about what Davidson means
by objective truth comes from his emphasis on
triangulation. Davidson thinks we need to inter-
act with another person in order to come to see
the world as external to us—in order to develop
a notion of objectivity. By linguistically triangu-
lating on an object with another, we are forced
to recognize that object as part of an objective
reality.  Davidson illustrates this  view in “The
second person”:
Belief,  intention,  and  the  other  proposi-
tional attitudes are all social in that they
are states a creature cannot be in without
having  the  concept  of  intersubjective
truth,  and  this  is  a  concept  one  cannot
have  without  sharing,  and  knowing  that
one shares, a world, and a way of thinking
about  the  world,  with  someone  else.
(2001b, p. 121)
However,  there are two fundamental  problems
with using triangulation as an argument for the
necessity of language for thought. First, there is
nothing  apparent  about triangulation that  re-
quires  spoken  language  as  opposed  to  some
other sort of joint interaction or non-linguistic
communication.  It  is,  indeed,  difficult  to  see
why language  as  opposed  to action  would be
operative in developing a notion of a world ex-
ternal  to  ourselves.  So  triangulation  fails  to
show  that  language  is  necessary  for  thought.
Second, it is difficult to see how triangulation
could itself suffice for a notion of objectivity. In
order for me to triangulate with another, I must
first see the other as part of the external world,
as opposed to an element in my mentality. As
long as the other is merely a part of the way I
take things to be, it cannot fulfil the role of the
second person (see for example,  Roskies 2011).
So triangulation also fails as a mechanism for
constructing  the  concept  of  objectivity.  Non-
etheless,  Davidson’s  emphasis  on triangulation
strongly suggests that by “objective truth” he is
referring to the appearance/reality distinction.
This interpretation is further strengthened
by  taking  seriously  the  fact  that  Davidson
thinks  the  concepts  of  belief  and  truth  are
closely linked (1984). As mentioned earlier, hav-
ing  the  concept  of  objective  truth  is  nothing
other than understanding that how the world is
can come apart from how one takes the world
to be. What evidence do we have that language
is required for this?
4.3 Surprise
As further evidence that Davidson intends a de-
flationary view of the concepts of belief and ob-
jective truth, we can turn to another formula-
tion of the Master Argument. In his most forth-
right explication of what he means by “concept
of belief”, he suggests that there is a behavioral
mark  that  is  coextensive  with  having  such  a
concept: surprise. 
In order to have any propositional attitude
at all, it is necessary to have the concept
of a belief, to have a belief about some be-
lief. But what is required in order to have
the concept  of  a  belief?  Here I  turn for
help to the phenomenon of surprise, since
I think that surprise requires the concept
of belief. (Davidson 2001a, p. 104)
The willingness to consider some sort of non-
linguistic behavior as relevant to the question
of  whether a creature has propositional  atti-
tudes is a methodological breakthrough, for it
provides  an  avenue  independent  of  language
for  assessing  whether  an  animal  has  the  re-
quisite  cognitive machinery to be  a believer.
Davidson maintains that the ability to be sur-
prised is  diagnostic of  having the concept of
belief. It indicates recognition that one’s own
mental representation fails to conform to that
which it represents, and as such it constitutes
necessary  and  sufficient  evidence  of  the
concept of belief.
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Following  this  intuition,  we  can  amend
Davidson’s  Master  Argument  to  incorporate
this insight:
S1 If S has propositional attitudes, then S has
beliefs.
S2 If S has beliefs, S has a concept of belief. 
S3 S has a concept of belief iff S has the capa-
city for surprise. 
S4 If S has the capacity for surprise, S has lan-
guage.
SC Propositional attitudes require language.
The idea that surprise goes hand-in-hand
with the concept of belief is not implausible: if
surprise issues from the recognition that one’s
belief about how the world is fails to correspond
with the way the world is, then surprise is good
evidence for the concept of belief. Moreover, be-
cause this idea does not have implications for
the ability to attribute propositional attitudes
to others in an operative sense, it suggests that
the  interpretation  of  “concept  of  belief”  that
Davidson favors is a deflationary interpretation:
one  that  involves  appreciation  of  the  appear-
ance/reality distinction, or, as discussed above,
the concept of objective truth. Thus,  S2 takes
the deflationary interpretation of the concept of
belief,  and  for  the  argument  to  be  valid,  S3
must also take that interpretation.
Unfortunately for this version of the argu-
ment,  S4 is false. There is clear and abundant
empirical  evidence  that  the ability to be sur-
prised at the mismatch between the world and
one’s own representation of the world is inde-
pendent of language (Dupoux 2001;  Feigenson
et al. 2002; Hauser & Carey 1998; Santos et al.
2002;  Wynn 1992).  Take,  for  example,  an  in-
valuable  tool  in  the  developmental  psycholo-
gist’s toolkit: the violation of expectancy look-
ing method (V) for testing infants. Many stud-
ies  performed  on  pre-linguistic  human infants
employ this paradigm in order to explore what
an infant knows. The idea is simple: infants look
longer  at stimuli  that  fail  to  correspond with
their expectations. This method has been used
to determine, among other things, that infants
have  an  innate  (or  very  early  developing)
concept of number. In now classic experiments,
Wynn and colleagues demonstrated that infants
can  do  simple  arithmetic  (Wynn 1992).  She
showed infants as young as five months a toy,
and placed it behind a screen. Then she showed
them another toy and also placed it behind the
screen. The screen was then lowered, revealing
either two toys (the expected outcome), or only
one toy. Infants looked longer at the unexpected
outcome. The same paradigm was used with dif-
ferent  numerical  combinations,  demonstrating
that for numerosity up to three, infants can do
simple  addition and subtraction,  and are sur-
prised when what is revealed behind the screen
does not comply with their expectations. Signi-
ficantly, this robust effect, which is due to sur-
prise, precedes the development of language by
more than a year.
Davidson might reply that it is not actu-
ally possessing language, but rather possessing
the  capacity for language that is important for
surprise,  and  thus  for  the  concept  of  belief.
Maybe, even though they cannot yet speak, in-
fants possess a language faculty, which, imma-
ture as it may be, is sufficient to support sur-
prise. However, this attempt to patch the argu-
ment also fails. The VELM is used frequently in
studies  with  nonhuman  primates,  and  while
they never develop language nor seem to have a
capacity for natural language, they too exhibit
surprise  when  their  expectations  are  violated
(Hauser 2000; Hauser et al. 1996). So, it seems,
language is not a requirement for surprise, nor
is surprise evidence for the presence of or capa-
city for language.
The  empirical  studies  of  developmental
psychologists and primatologists undermine the
Surprise version of the Master Argument: sur-
prise  does  not  depend upon having  language.
Moreover, if premises S2 and S3 are true—if the
capacity for surprise is evidence of the concept
of belief, and if propositional attitudes depend
upon possession of the concept of belief—then
propositional attitudes do not depend upon lan-
guage.
Let us briefly revisit the Objective Truth
version of the Master Argument. I have argued
that  only  a  deflationary  notion  of  objective
truth is a candidate interpretation for the argu-
ment. I have also suggested that this is the only
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notion of “the concept of objective truth” that
meshes with the arguments Davidson raises re-
garding  belief  and  surprise.  Thus,  having  a
concept of objective truth is having a concept
that the way the world is can come apart from
how one takes it to be. If this is correct, then
the Objective Truth version of the Master Argu-
ment is false. 
In Wynn’s  looking-time studies  discussed
above, the child has clearly developed expecta-
tions of what lies behind the screen, and must
somehow  represent  this  to  herself.  When  the
screen is lowered and the child sees what is be-
hind the screen, there must be some sense in
which correspondence with the expectation or
lack of correspondence is noted, and in which
the data coming in from the senses is privileged
over the internal representation. This is, in es-
sence, what it is to recognize that beliefs about
the  world  can  come  apart  from the  way  the
world  is.  Clearly  this  sort  of  grasp  of  reality
does not depend upon language: pre-linguistic
infants  and  non-linguistic  animals  possess  it.
One can easily imagine how violation of expect-
ation can be instantiated in a system with ima-
gistic thought. The languageless child need only
conjure up an image of the objects behind the
screen and compare this with the visual scene
before him. As long as the child privileges the
sensory information over the mental representa-
tion,  we might  say  that  he  has  a  concept  of
reality and of  the belief/reality distinction. In
summary, then, language is not required for a
concept of objective truth.
4.4 The intermediate conception of belief
We have ruled out both the robust and weakest
notions of “concept of belief” as candidate no-
tions  for  a  successful  interpretation  of  David-
son’s argument linking belief to language. Per-
haps  an  intermediate  notion  can  do  the  job.
This notion involves the ability to attribute rep-
resentational states to oneself and others; it is
less sophisticated than that required to pass the
false-belief task, but more complex than the re-
cognition of an appearance/reality distinction. 
One potential reason why representational-
state attribution may be important for having
beliefs involves self-reflection: perhaps being a
believer requires being able to think of oneself
as a believer, and thus requires the concept of
belief.  This amounts to the claim that beliefs
cannot be held non-reflectively. Since we clearly
do  have  beliefs  that  we  do  not  have  beliefs
about, what is at issue is not the actuality of
having beliefs about beliefs, but the possibility
or capacity to do so. However, while there are
arguments that the ability to think about one-
self as a believer is required for a rich construal
of  theoretical  rationality  (see  Bermúdez 2003,
Ch. 7), there is no clear argument why such re-
flective ability should be constitutive of having
beliefs. Indeed, it seems like the ability to be-
lieve  things  about  one’s  beliefs  would  require
that one could believe things, so that belief is
conceptually prior to self-reflection. In any case,
self-reflection  is  not  Davidson’s  stated  reason
for thinking that the concept of belief is import-
ant for having beliefs.
The other reason to hold that having be-
lief requires having a concept of belief under the
intermediate conception links the ability to at-
tribute mental states to others with having the
concept of belief. Thus there are two different
strengths of intermediate interpretations to con-
sider.  According  to  the  less  demanding  inter-
pretation, a concept of belief is required in or-
der  to  attribute  contentful  states  to  other
creatures;  whereas  the  more  demanding inter-
pretation holds that a concept of  belief  is  re-
quired  to  attribute  propositional  attitudes  to
others: one must be an interpreter, not just an
interpretee.
We  can  discount  the  less  demanding  of
these interpretations for the purpose of this ar-
gument linking thought to language,14 because if
M2 (“If S has beliefs, then S has a concept of
belief”) is interpreted in this way, then M3, the
claim that language is required for a concept of
belief, read in this way, is false. There is grow-
ing  evidence  that  non-language-using  animals
are able to attribute representational states to
other  animals.  One  compelling  illustration  of
this comes from (Hare et al. 2000), who show
14 We ought to reject this interpretation for the purposes of Davidson’s
argument, despite the fact that we may ultimately agree with it as a
necessary condition for having propositional thought.
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that subordinate rhesus monkeys only approach
food in the presence of a dominant male when
they know that the male is unable to see the
food (interestingly, dominant males appear not
to care whether or not a subordinate male sees
food, pointing to yet a further level of sophistic-
ation in the cognitive processes of non-linguistic
animals). Thus, if it is the case that to believe
requires having the ability to attribute content-
ful mental states to others, then it is not the
case  that  believing  requires  language.  Indeed,
recent  work on  non-human primate  theory of
mind suggests  that  monkeys and chimpanzees
have  a  theory  of  mind  that  represents  goal
states and distinguishes between knowledge and
ignorance of other agents (the presence and ab-
sence  of  contentful  mental  representations),
even if it fails to account for misrepresentation
(Call &  Tomasello 2008;  Kaminski et al. 2008;
Marticorena et  al. 2011).  Although  they  may
have a less articulated theory of mind than we
do, we may nonetheless adequately characterize
their representational system with mental-state
terms (Butterfill &  Apperly 2013;  Marticorena
et al. 2011). 
What remains is the notion that the abil-
ity to attribute beliefs  qua propositional  atti-
tudes to others is necessary for having beliefs.
That is,  not only must  they attribute mental
states to others, but those mental states must
possess the characteristics of beliefs. Remember
that we have already discounted the robust no-
tion of belief as too demanding, so what is ne-
cessary  is  not  that  animals  have  a  notion  of
false belief per se, but rather that they have a
notion of a belief as a representational mental
state that can play a role in behavioral explana-
tion or prediction. So far there is no compelling
evidence that nonhuman animals have this, con-
sistent with the possibility that such a repres-
entational  ability  as  this  may  indeed  require
language, or at least some sophisticated ability
to symbolize abstractions and predicate them of
objects. Whether this is so is ultimately an em-
pirical question. However, at least some philo-
sophers think monkeys may be able to do this.
As  Lurz characterizes the above studies, anim-
als  do  have  the  ability  to  represent  proposi-
tional mental states in others—not as attitudes
aimed at representing objective truth, but in-
stead as  attitudes  with  propositional  contents
that  provide  information  regarding motivation
to act (2011a). Lurz characterizes this as a kind
of  belief–desire  attribution.  Baillargeon’s  data
proves relevant here too, for her results are best
explained by taking the infants in her study as
postulating representational mental states of the
actor in order to predict her behavior; violation
of their expectation causes them to look longer.
Thus, without imputing these infants some un-
derstanding  of  others’  representational  mental
states, we would be unable to account for this
data. However, in this case  M3 would then be
false, for the linguistic abilities of fifteen-month-
old infants typically are minimal—certainly not
of the sophistication we would expect would be
necessary  to  linguistically  encode  a  belief-
concept. While the evidence that bears on this
case is  perhaps the least well-established, and
this study involves infants at an age when they
are poised to develop language, the burden of
proof is shifted to the person who wants to ar-
gue that language is necessary for a concept of
belief. That burden is not discharged: Davidson
lacks a positive argument for why this relatively
demanding notion of attributing content to oth-
ers is the one required for an organism to be a
believer.
5 Beyond interpretationism
Davidson argues that language is  required for
thought. His Master Argument posits that hav-
ing a concept of belief is a necessary intermedi-
ary for having propositional attitudes, and that
language is  necessary for  having a concept  of
belief. Of the various conceptions of “concept of
belief” that might play a role in Davidson’s ar-
gument,  the  robust  conception  is  too  strong,
and empirically falsified. While the robust con-
ception may require language, we attribute pro-
positional  attitudes before children are clearly
in possession of such concepts. Davidson’s ex-
amples and arguments support only deflation-
ary interpretations of the concept of belief and
the associated concept of objective truth: those
that involve distinguishing between appearance
and  reality,  or  those  that  involve  attributing
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mental content. However,  as numerous studies
in  developmental  and  comparative  psychology
have shown, the deflationary conception is one
that  many  creatures  without  language  enjoy.
Even an intermediate conception does not seem
to play the role Davidson’s argument requires,
for the ability to attribute mental content does
not require language, and neither does the abil-
ity to attribute to others representational men-
tal states, though here the evidence is less clear.
Davidson’s arguments seem compelling because
their plausibility relies upon a slide between less
and more demanding conceptions of the concept
of  belief.  For  instance,  a  weak  conception  of
“concept of belief” in  M2 and a robust one in
M3 yields  an  argument  with  apparently  true
premises, but because the argument equivocates
on “concept of belief”, the argument is invalid.
This analysis, as well as an appreciation of the
methodological considerations for using non-lin-
guistic behavior as evidence of propositional at-
titudes,  supports  the  view  that  some  mental
states  of  non-linguistic  animals  can  aptly  be
classified as propositional attitudes.
In empirical circles it  seems to be taken
for granted that at least some non-linguistic an-
imals have mental states best described as pro-
positional  attitudes.  But  this  acceptance  is
merely the first step in a larger project. For ex-
ample, even if there is good reason to think that
non-linguistic creatures have propositional atti-
tudes, how they could have these remains to be
elucidated. That is, what is the nature of the
representational  resources  available  to  them?
And  given  these  representational  resources,
what sorts of contents are they capable of rep-
resenting? What kinds of reasoning and infer-
ence could such representations support? What
are  the  cognitive  limitations  necessitated  by
their  representational  architectures?  One  can
begin addressing these fascinating questions em-
pirically  either  at  the functional  psychological
level or at the level of representation, and from
either  level  one  can  work  toward  answering
questions about the other. 
Instead of thinking that language itself is
what  makes  complex,  structured,  or  proposi-
tional thought possible, we should consider: 1)
how  non-linguistic  capacities  could  underlie
complex representational abilities 2) the unique
elements  of  linguistic  competence  and  what
they may or  may not  make possible  vis-à-vis
thought.  In  an  example  of  the  first,  Proust
(1999); see also this collection) provides an illu-
minating philosophical discussion of structured
non-linguistic  representational  abilities  (or
“structured competences”) and how they could
make possible objective representations. Struc-
tured  representations  as  such  could  form the
building blocks of propositional attitudes. Ber-
mudez argues for abilities and for certain logical
limitations on both the inferential and repres-
entational abilities of non-linguistic representers
(Bermúdez 2003). Whether such limitations ne-
cessarily  obtain  is  a  matter  of  dispute  (Lurz
2007). 
When considering  how linguistic  abilities
could augment thought, it is useful to identify
elements of  language that could contribute to
representational  complexity  even  if  present
without all the components of language. For ex-
ample, Clark suggests that the human language-
like ability to use symbols to represent abstract
objects allows us to objectify our own thoughts
and operate upon them (2000). Depending on
what things can be symbolized, this could make
possible metacognition or higher-order thought
that might not otherwise be possible. Thus, the
ability to represent  symbolically can influence
the kinds and complexity of reasoning available
to a creature, even if that creature is not lin-
guistic in Davidson’s sense. Symbolic capacities
are  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  linguistic
competence,  and  could  be  present  even  when
language is not. And if mere use of symbols is
taken to be sufficient for language, then some
nonhuman primates are capable of language and
thus again can have propositional attitudes. In-
deed, it is clear that some nonhuman primates
can be trained to use abstract symbols, even if
they do not do so naturally.  Boysen and col-
leagues,  for example,  relate how naïve chimps
fail  to  learn  to  make second-order  generaliza-
tions  about  object  classification,  but  those
trained to associate objects  with symbols (for
relations of “same” and “different”) are able to
succeed  on  a  second-order  classification  task
(Thompson et al. 1997). These interesting res-
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ults give causal punch to the notion that sym-
bolic objectification is a prerequisite for higher-
level or abstract thought, and help to explain
the  competences  that  appear  to  come  along
with linguistic abilities. 
Focusing less on the vehicles and more on
the ways in which they can be exploited, Fitch
and colleagues argue that recursion, which is a
core element of natural language processing, can
only operate on symbolic structures subject to
rules, and that neither rules nor the objects on
which they operate can exist without language-
like representations (Hauser et al. 2002). If so,
one might expect that forms of reasoning that
rely  on  recursion  may  only  be  possible  for
creatures that also possess linguistic capacities.
Thus, use of symbols and recursive rules are two
candidates that could help explain the different
representational capacities of linguistic and non-
linguistic creatures.
6 Conclusion 
Here I have argued that Davidson‘s arguments
that  nonlinguistic  creatures  lack  thought  are
either unsound or invalid. While this negative
project does not allow us to conclude that they
have  propositional  attitudes  or  thoughts,  it
makes  room  for  positive  arguments  that  will
take advantage of  recent and future empirical
work on animal cognition and on the nature of
nonlinguistic  representations  and  their  role  in
cognitive processing, as well as for novel negat-
ive arguments that might set limits on the capa-
cities  of  nonlinguistic  creatures. Much  current
research in animal cognition focuses on whether
animals have theory of mind paralleling that of
humans (Marticorena et al. 2011), or metacog-
nition (Bermúdez 2003; Carruthers 2008;  Lurz
2007,  2011a, 2011b; Proust 2010).  One  might
therefore  think  that the  debate  has  not  pro-
gressed much since Davidson asked the question
about  whether  animals  can  have  a  concept
of belief. But Davidson’s interest in these ques-
tions was narrow, driven by his interpretation-
ism and the view that these states are necessary
for being an interpreter and thus for possessing
mental  content.  In  contrast, contemporary  re-
search does not aim to disprove the existence of
propositional attitudes, but rather to elucidate
the  scope  of  these  attitudes  and  understand-
ing the ways in which they may be limited by
limitations  in representational resources. In  the
most exciting work, the philosophical and psy-
chological projects come together. This interdis-
ciplinary  approach  takes seriously evolutionary
relationships and has a more nuanced view of
the  human  being’s place  among  other  anim-
als. The arguments that result will be of great
interest to philosophers of language and mind,
as well as to those interested in ethical issues
that transcend academia. And while they may
vindicate a certain kind of human exceptional-
ism,  they  may also  articulate  our  place  on  a
spectrum that will ultimately lead to a more in-
tegrated  and  humane  picture  of  our place  in
the world.
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